the village and enable further development projects to begin. Brigadier General Nicholson stressed
that residents and local leadership
needed to step up and take control
of Now Zad or risk the town being
returned to the Taliban. As a result
of the shura, close coordination and
planning commenced between the
Marines, PM/WRA, U.S. Embassy,
United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan, local leadership and the NGOs.

U.S. and local leadership must be involved to ensure the “bridge” from hold
to build is successful.
Photo courtesy of the author

Vital to the NGOs and the leaders of Now Zad were assurances of
security from Task Force Leatherneck—security that was not visible, but effective. What eventually
materialized was a collaborative effort for a $1.8 million project with
three of the five NGOs (Mine Clearance Planning Agency, the Demining Agency for Afghanistan and
the Mine Detection Center) where
the strengths of each organization
were leveraged. The project began in
March 2010 and is scheduled to be
completed within 12 months, employing more than 120 local staff,
benefitting more than 1,350 families and clearing 594,000 square kilometers (229,345 square miles) of
land covering the four most affect-
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ed communities in and around Now
Zad: Ali Zai, Barakzi, Deh Meyan
and Sarkani.
Over and above the initial benefits, the project includes the establishment of a clinic, primarily
for the medical care of the deminers, but also to serve as a source of
health support for the citizens of
Now Zad. As the word spread that
deminers were starting their work,
many of the displaced members of
Now Zad started to return, some for
the first time in four years.
CBD has been conducted in Afghanistan for several years, with
projects funded and executed in Kunar, Nangahar and Kandahar provinces. The projects’ workforce was
recruited from the local area and
included vocational training. Unlike the projects that began several years after fighting had ceased in
the Kunar, Nangahar and Kandahar
provinces, however, the project in
Now Zad commenced within weeks
of combat concluding, giving development agencies the opportunity to
provide relief to the Now Zad area
sooner than expected. The project
in Now Zad is seen as a model for
future uses of CBD, especially since
it uses Afghan NGOs and beginning
work early with local authorities
means clearance operations can allow relief and development to arrive
quickly. This further builds the population’s confidence in the NATO
International Security Assistance
Force’s work, and more importantly, in the local Afghan government.
Conclusion

Confidence is key to successful
counterinsurgency operations. The
local population must have confidence in the forces in its area and in

the agencies and organizations providing relief and development. The
Marine Corps’ approach to counterinsurgency stresses building this
confidence through close coordination and partnering with local
forces, government officials and the
citizens of the areas for which they
are responsible. In order to provide
relief and development quickly, the
time between hold and build must be
as short as possible. Many times, due
to combat operations recently concluding, this time is delayed in order
to clear the area of explosive remnants of war. This delay could potentially result in a loss of confidence by
the local communities in the forces
operating in their area. CBD is yet
another way for the United States
to insure that the “bridge” from
hold to build is as short as possible.
see endnotes page 80
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Destruction of Cluster Munitions
in Moldova
For some countries affected by cluster munitions, the obligations to demilitarize that
accompany ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions may appear daunting.
In 2009, however, Norwegian People’s Aid undertook a pilot project in Moldova to
find a cheaper, more efficient alternative-disposal method. They discovered that not
only can destruction of cluster munitions be done more effectively, but also that by
using locally administered programs, international organizations can promote capacity building and increased employment while also bolstering national pride and commitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
by Colin King [ C King Associates, Ltd. ]

D

uring the Oslo Process, it became
clear that several nations were concerned about their obligations to destroy cluster munition stockpiles under Article
3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In
fact, it soon became apparent that this might be
a significant obstacle to signing or ratification
for some countries.
Industrial demilitarization plants exist in
several developed nations; however, costs are
high, and most are running at or near capacity.
Even if the resources were available, it would
be uneconomical for an industrial unit to gear
up for the disposal of small quantities of cluster munitions, especially if these were unusual
types. A new process would involve a great deal
of additional effort, including research on the
ammunition, development of a new procedure,
fabricating or adapting existing machinery, retraining the workforce, development of adequate quality control measures and so forth.
The need for another option led Norwegian
People’s Aid to examine alternative-disposal means on a national or regional basis. One
possible benefit of using locally administered
programs was program ownership. This ownership, or increased national involvement,
brings with it tangible gains, such as capacity
building and increased employment, as well as

intangible gains, such as a strong demonstration of commitment to the CCM and a sense
of national pride. Other potential advantages of
utilizing locally administered programs included lower cost and faster completion. During the
2008–09 period, a preliminary study established
that locally administered, alternative-disposal
options were realistic.
Moldova Pilot Program

The concept of small-scale regional programs was presented at the 2009 Berlin
Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions;1 here, Moldova was among a small
number of delegations that approached NPA
to express an interest in a pilot project.
An NPA assessment team visited Moldova
in October 2009 and identified five types of
Russian cluster-bomb and submunition payloads in the Moldovan inventory. The submunitions included three types of anti-armor
bomblets (PTAB-2.5, PTAB-2.5M and PTAB10-5) and two types of fragmentation bomblets (AO-1SCh and AO-2.5RT). Externally, the
bombs were in reasonably good condition,
suggesting that the submunitions would be
well-preserved.
Unloading of cluster bombs. The NPA team
conducted all work at a Bulboaca military
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Moldovan soldiers, under supervision, removing the tail from an
RBK-500 cluster bomb.
All photos courtesy of the author

facility, which includes a demolition area. Bomb disassembly was carried out in two adjacent tents, despite
extremely cold weather and heavy snow. A team of Moldovan soldiers, trained in demolition under NPA supervision for unloading the submunitions from the bombs
and assembling the demolitions, mainly used the first
tent. The NPA team used the second tent for submunition disassembly.
The two types of bomb containers, RBK-250 and
RBK-500, were similar in structure and were easily unloaded once the tail section was removed. After refining their technique, the Moldovan soldiers successfully
conducted the unloading procedure in approximately 20
minutes per bomb.
Submunition disassembly. One of the primary objectives was to create simple, practical processes to remove
bomblet fuzes, thereby exposing the explosive filling in
order to make subsequent demolition simple and safe.
This objective was achieved with four out of the five submunition types, with the AO-2.5RT as the exception. A
number of these bomblets were also dismantled and defuzed; however, the process was considered too delicate,
and therefore dangerous, for inclusion in a regional destruction program.
In keeping with the concept of regional program
ownership, locally available tools were used wherever possible. The few exceptions included hook-and-pin
wrenches and a chain vice, which was particularly useful for securing the bomblet bodies.
Explosive demolition. Successful explosive demolition of cluster munitions is notoriously difficult, as
unexploded submunitions tend to be “kicked out.” Bom-
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blets may become armed as they are ejected from the
demolition, risking widespread site contamination with
hazardous ordnance.
The relatively straightforward process of removing
the submunitions from the bomb body makes successful
demolition substantially easier. Furthermore, taking the
additional step of defuzing the bomblets before demolition not only eliminates much of the residual hazard,
but also exposes the high-explosive filling, thus further
increasing the likelihood of complete detonation.
Once defuzed, demolitions were prepared by placing
the bomblet bodies in wooden ammunition crates and
covering them with a layer of TNT demolition blocks.
This allowed the indoor preparation of shots, minimizing the time needed for final preparation at the demolition grounds. The efficiency of this process indicated
that this technique could be employed successfully on a
far larger scale.

AO-1Sch bomblet bodies after the explosive charge has been
burned out.

Burning. Burning has a number of potential advantages for bomblet destruction, including avoidance of the
noise and shock involved in demolition, elimination of
the need for large stocks of high explosives, minimizing
metallic contamination, and the retention of steel scrap.
Burning normally requires detonator extraction and
exposure of the main explosive filling, which was easily
achieved in a single step by removal of the fuze-assembly from all of the bomblet types, except for the AO2.5RT. Once defuzed, the bomblet bodies were stacked

into wooden ammunition crates
and covered with a propellant layer
that had been salvaged from artillery ammunition. The bomblet bodies were then ignited remotely using
electrical squibs placed into small
bags of black powder.2
The A-IX-2 explosive used in the
AO-1SCh bomblet was particularly difficult to ignite, and burning
out these bomblets required careful
preparation. A number of successful
burns were conducted, once again
indicating the technique could be
applied within a large-scale process.
Inerting. A selection of each
bomblet type was designated free
from explosives for use as demonstration and training aids. This involved complete disassembly of the
fuzing-system to locate and remove
all components containing energetic
material and refitting the now freefrom-explosive fuze assembly to a
bomblet body from which the explosive had been burned out.
A simple quality-control system
was implemented for the inerting
process, involving two people independently confirming the absence
of explosive components, with each
marking the assembly using paint.
The finished training aids were then
marked clearly in blue, the NATO
color code for inert items.
Re-use of warheads. Fuze and
tail-assembly removal offers the
possibility of retaining the shaped
charge warhead for non-hostile applications, such as explosive-ordnance disposal, demolition or
engineering. This option was highlighted during early program proposals and is especially relevant to
the warheads used in PTAB bomblets; it may also be applicable to dual-purpose improved-conventional

Removing the fuze from a PTAB-2.5.

munition, such as the US M42, M46
and M77 series.
PTAB-2.5 and PTAB-2.5M-bomblet disassembly confirmed the
achievability of this option. However, a complication in the PTAB2.5M-shaped charge is the presence
of a flash-receptive detonator, which
must be pressed out to make it safe.
Conclusions

The research-and-development
phase of Moldova’s pilot program
was a great success despite extreme
weather, a difficult operating environment and a restricted time
frame. The operation confirmed that
regional demilitarization programs
involving Russian cluster bombs require minimal resources and could,
therefore, be implemented anywhere.
As an unexpected bonus, Moldova quickly announced its intention to ratify the CCM, having been
commended for its positive engagement and encouraged by its ability
to achieve the demands of Article
3. Moldova subsequently became
the final state needed to trigger the
CCM’s entry into force.
In addition to the immediate results, the availability of such a national capability may well prove
valuable for further regional cluster-munition destruction programs.
Furthermore, the facilities and expertise in ammunition disposal may
be utilized or adapted for other ammunition types, which will inevita-

bly require attention as aging Soviet
ordnance becomes unusable.
Currently, the NPA team is liaising with a number of other countries that are interested in developing
their own locally administered cluster-munitions destruction programs.
The question is whether the principle
can be applied safely to more complex or challenging ammunition,
such as cargo projectiles, rockets and
NATO cluster bombs.
Reproduced with permission from
HIS (Global) Limited–Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal, 2010–11.
Note: Since this article was written, Moldova has concluded the final phase of this project, in which
their entire stockpile of cluster bombs
was destroyed. The work was carried out by Moldovan soldiers under
the supervision of NPA and C King
Associates Ltd, making them the first
nation to achieve compliance with
CCM Article 3 using a “self-help” demilitarization program.
see endnotes page 80
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